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1. Summary 
On 2 September 1965 an accident causing damage to the azimuth hydrostatic 
th rus t  bearing occurred  during a routine azimuth rotation of the antenna by the 
contractor  to tes t  the cable wrap-up. 
front pad of the bearing had grounded and that the result ing force had broken the 
antirotation link support  on the pad, permitting the pad to rotate  and push out 
the r e se rvo i r  w a l l s  ( s ee  photograph, Figure 4). 
s e v e r e  gall marks  about 3 inches from the inside wall and covering about 
180 deg of the runner (Figures  6 through 12), on the right inside corner  of the 
r e a r  pad and along the full length of the inner sill of the right front pad (F igures  
13 through 16). 
bottom of each pad and a t  various places on the runner surface.  
shown on the runner  damage layout, Figure 1,  and in the attached photographs. 
A careful  investigation together with tes t s  on the hydraulic sys t em has 
Immediate inspection showed that the right 
Fu r the r  investigation revealed 
There  were  also minor scra tches  and burnish m a r k s  on the 
These a r e  
shown that the p r imary  cause of the accident was m i s - s e t  relief valves in t ke  
hydraulic supply sys tem.  
the pads below that necessary  to maintain proper bearing operation. 
contributing fac tors  were  the par t ia l  closing of the shutoff valves downstream of 
the relief valves, undersizing of the high p r e s s u r e  f i l ters  and possibly the 
presence  of foreign par t ic les  in the sill a r e a  under the pads. 
The result ing relief valve action cut down the flow to 
Other 
The accident was due entirely to human e r r o r  and does not ref lect  on the 
bas ic  sys t em design. 
of a similar accident in the future. 
resul t ing f rom the accident has now been repaired at  contractor  expense and the 
bear ing is again operational.  
Safety interlocks a r e  being included to prevent  occurrence 
The damage to the bearing components 
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a The action of the bearing under the conditions which existed because of the 
mis  - se t  re l ief  valves is within the patterns established by the original theoret ical  
and experimental  work done a t  the Franklin Institute during the design phase of 
the project (Frankl in  Institute Reports F-B2099 and F-B2015). 
, 
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2 .  Fai lure  Sequence 
A thorough review of the antenna activit ies and data developed in 
subsequent t e s t s  reveals  the following probable sequence of events leading tip to 
the grounding and damage which occurred a t  16:OO on 2 September  1965. 
I , The bearing was originally put into operation 4 December 1964. Since 
I 
then it has  been used  f rom time to t ime fo r  antenna rotations requi red  for  con- 
s t ruct ion and fo r  bearing t e s t  purposes.  
these periods and all tes t s  indicated that it w a s  operating within the design 
paramerers .  
a 
No difficulties we re  encountered during 
On 9 June a thorough cleaning of the hydrostatic bearing was completed, 
the runner  w a s  inspected and the bearing w a s  refi l led with oil. 
time t h e r e  was no indication on the runner of any previous grounding of 
At this 
the bearing pads. 
On 30 July all of the relief valves on the high p r e s s u r e  skids were  s e t  at a 
1500 psi  by the bearing subcontractor and the bearing was considered 
ope ration a1 . 
On 31 July JPL conducted film height tes t s  on the right front pad and 
found operational film heights corresponding to those predicted on the 
or iginal  design. 
subcontractor ,  at the completion of these tests the relief valves on the 
high p r e s s u r e  skid fo r  this  pad were  l e f t  at 900 psi .  Although the film 
heights were  as expected, this relief valve sett ing is marginal  for  antenna 
operation. 
On 12 August the antenna was moved f rom position one to  position two 
(F igu re  1). 
On 2 3  August a contractor  technician fitted each high p r e s s u r e  fi l ter  with 
a differential  p r e s s u r e  gauge and left the high p r e s s u r e  skids with the 
3 
a 
(See Appendix 111. .) Due to a misunderstanding with the 
This is discussed in section 3 of this report .  
0 
No pad o r  runner  marks  a r e  direct ly  t raceable  to this motion. 
relief valves s e t  a t  approximately 900 psi  for  the corner  r e c e s s  c i rcu i t s  
and approximately 1200 psi  for the center r e c e s s  c i rcu i t s .  This sett ing 
was too low to maintain full operational flow to all r e c e s s e s  of the bear ing 
pads under normal  operating conditions. The r e a r  pad w a s  in par t icular  
difficulty a t  this point because one of the skid p r e s s u r e  gauges, by which 
the relief valve sett ings were  made, was reading approximately 150 ps i  
high. 
below 900 psi. 
detail  in  Section 3 of this repor t .  
On 24 August the antenna was move in azimuth clockwise f rom position two 
(Figure  1) through position three to  position four in  connection with the 
hyperbola installation and other construction operations.  The evidence 
indicates that  during this motion the right inner  co rne r  of the r e a r  pad 
w a s  dragging, cutting scra tches  about 1/  16 in. wide and about . 015 in. 
deep in  the runner  approximately 3 1 / 2  in. f rom the inner  wall (F igure  11). 
The  dragging force  of the pad was accentuated by the action of the pad anti- 
rotation link, which tends, for this configuration of drag  and direction of 
motion, to f o r c e  the dragging corner  into the runner  while keeping the 
pad f rom rotating. 
On 24 and 25 August in connection with placing the feed cone, the antenna 
was  rotated counter clockwise f rom position four through position five to  
posit ion six (Figure  1). 
the motion was in the opposite direction of that  going f rom position two to  
posit ion four,  probably cleared the dragging co rne r  of the r e a r  pad causing 
l i t t l e  o r  no damage to  the runner. 
On 26 August a JPL technician conducted fur ther  t e s t s  on the right front 
pad,  finding that at that t ime the bearing was operating with the usual  
I 
Thus, in reali ty the relief valve for that  r e c e s s  w a s  actually s e t  
The effect of the low relief valve sett ings is discussed in 
0 
0 
(See F igure  2. ) 
During this motion the anti-rotation link, because 
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I. 
firm heights. 
at 900 ps i  for  the corner  r eces s  c i rcui ts  and 1200 ps i  for the center  r eces s  
c i rcu i t s ,  comparable to the other pad circui ts .  
On 30 August the antenna w a s  moved clockwise f rom position s i x  to 
position seven, and then on 2 September to position eight where the final 
damage occurred.  
this t ime) .  
w a s  again dragging, causing smal l  sc ra tches  as previously descr ibed 
until it reached the 5 o 'clock position on Figure  1,  when the scratching 
changed to galling (F igures  6,  7 ,  and 8).  The galling continued until the 
pad w a s  in about the 10 o 'clock position (F igures  9 and 10). 
f irst  one lump then a second lump of meta l  were  ejected f rom behind the 
pad, apparently relieving the galling so  that no fur ther  se r ious  damage 
was done by the rear pad during the balance of the motion to position 
eight. 
m a r k s  lef t  by the r e a r  pad in  the 5 to 6 o 'clock sect ion of the runner .  
These  "cutting and abrading tools" caused s e v e r e  damage over  the en t i re  
length of the pad and finally resulted in so much rotational movement 
tha t  the torque link, which normally r e s t r a ins  such  rotation, w a s  broken. 
At the conclusion of these tes t s  the relief valves were  s e t  
0 .  
(See Appendix I for detailed description of events a t  
During this motion the r e a r  pad inner  r ight  corner  apparently 
At this point 
In the meant ime the right pad encountered the c r e s t s  of the ga l l  
In  considering the above chronology, it mus t  be recognized that each pad 
w a s  operat ing marginal ly  because of the mis-set relief valves and because of 
high downstream p r e s s u r e  lo s ses  in the shut off valves and high p r e s s u r e  f i l t e rs  
These  a r e  discussed in  detail in  Section 3 of this report .  
w a s  caused  by the rear pad even though the final stoppage w a s  re la ted to the 
r ight  f ron  pad. 
w a s  pract ical ly  undamaged. 
The init ial  damage 
The left  f ront  pad s a w  only s m a l l  s c ra t ches  in the runner  and 
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3. Hydrostatic Bearing Operation 
A hydrostatic bearing, in i ts  simplest  fo rm,  consis ts  of a pad and a 
runner.  
and escapes in a film to f o r m  the gap between the pad and the runner.  
p r e s s u r e  in the fluid forcing it out through the film ac t s  upon the a r e a  of the 
pad to support the load on the pad. 
r e c e s s e s  in the pad extend the area under maximum p r e s s u r e  and se rve  to  
stabil ize the bearing at uniform film thickness.  
Fluid is forced through an opening to a r e c e s s  in the bottom of the pad 
The 
~ 
i 
In the 210 f t .  AAS hydrostatic bearing six 
The U S  hydrostatic bearing requires  constant flow to each of the r e c e s s e s  
for proper  operation. 
this requirement .  
the oil flowing out under the pad ac t  upward on the pad, supporting it ana its 
load. I f  the load is increased  the pad will sink slightly reducing the film height 
between the pad and the runner  and hence the c r o s s  sectional a r e a  available for  
flow. The reduced flow a r e a  requires  a higher p r e s s u r e  to discharge the 
constant oil flow, res tor ing  equilibrium between the oil  p r e s s u r e s  and the load. 
F o r  constant oil  flow 
Oil f rom individual constant displacement pumps meets  
As descr ibed above, the p r e s s u r e s  in the r e c e s s e s  ana in 
In normal  operation the bearing is extremely s t i f f .  
and o i l  viscosity the film height var ies  inversely as the th i rd  root of the load, 
SO that  doubling the load will decrease the original .010 in. film height only 
approximately 0.0016 in. for  the AAS bearing in  no rma l  operation. 
I f  the oil supply is modified so as to have a constant p r e s s u r e  such as 
that provided by a p r e s s u r e  regulator,  r a the r  than a constant flow, the bearing 
h a s  vir tual ly  no s t i f fness  (neglecting the flow los ses  in the l ine).  Any inc rease  
in load  will cause the pad to se t t le  until the pat tern of oil and d i rec t  contact 
p r e s s u r e s  under the pad is in equilibrium with the load. 
governed by the available flow passages along the pad face f rom the r e c e s s e s  
out to the r e s e r v o i r  , and by the p re s su re  of the supply system. 
In this ca se  f low is 
The 
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equilibrium mechanism of the constant flow source  system descr ibed above 
does not exist  and the pad w i l l  drift  downward until a p re s su re - load  equilibrium 
is reached. This point is discussed in Appendix I1 in a repor t  made by Dr .  
V. Castell i  a f t e r  an inspection of the bearing damage. Dr.  Castel l i  did the 
basic design of the bearing f o r  the Franklin Institute. 
I 
With a constant p r e s s u r e  flow source the effect of p r e s s u r e  lo s ses  
in the l ines  between the pump and pad is to decrease  the p r e s s u r e  available 
in the r e c e s s e s  a t  high flow ra t e s  and to inc rease  the recess p r e s s u r e  
to approach the source  p r e s s u r e  a t  lower flow ra tes .  This charac te r i s t ic  
given the bearing a margina l  stiffness because increased  load will lower 
the film height and the flow. The lower flow has  l e s s  p r e s s u r e  drop  in the 
l ines ,  and m o r e  p r e s s u r e  is available in  the r e c e s s e s  to  c a r r y  the increased  
load. 
The p r e s s u r e  relief valves used to protect  the sys t em against  over  
p r e s s u r e  will function l ike a p res su re  regulator i f  the downstream p r e s s u r e  
exceeas the relief valve setting. 
where independent flow sources  are  provided f o r  each r e c e s s  the situation is 
quite complex. 
the accident,  it is possible for  the p r e s s u r e  in  one r e c e s s  to  reach  the relief 
valve sett ing in that r e c e s s  supply sys tem while the other  r e c e s s e s  a r e  iunction- 
ing normally.  In such a case ,  depending on the flow between the r eces ses  and 
the re la ted  p r e s s u r e  pat terns ,  supply flow to that r e c e s s  may be cut off entirely.  
This  m a y  cause  o ther  r e c e s s  p re s su res  to reach  the t r igger  relief valve p r e s s u r e  
in the respect ive c i rcu i t s  and the pad drops l ike the proverbial  l ead  balloon. 
With the mul t i - recess  pads used  on the AhS 
With the relief valves se t  too low, as they were  at the t ime of 
F r o m  the data available pertinent to the r e a r  pad, i t  appears  that at 
l e a s t  one,  and possibly as many as 4 r e c e s s e s ,  had operational p r e s s u r e s  
exceeding the relief valve setting. It is not possible to determine the s ta tus  
8 
of the front right pad, which was n-lost sever ly  damaged, altiAough at the time of 1. 
the last JPL tes t s  it was functioning a t  normal  film heights.  
9 
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Analysis of the Causes of Accident 
The high p res su re  supply system f o r  each r e c e s s  consis ts  of an e lec t r ic  
motor  driving a constant displacement pump, a p r e s s u r e  relief valve,  a s k ~ t -  
off valve, a high p r e s s u r e  f i l t e r ,  piping and hoses  to the paa. A check valve 
a t  the pad entry s e r v e s  to prevent flow f rom the pad back into the l ines in the , 
event of line breakage o r  pump shutdown; this is shown schematically in 
F igure  3.  
the failure is discussed below: 
The definite or possible contributions of each of these elerrLents to 
(a) Constant Displacement Fbmps 
Field measurements  on the constant displacen,ent pumps showec a 
flow ra te  of approximately 8.2 gpm instead of the 7 .5  gprn specified 
in the design. This flow inc rease  would cause  a sl ight i cc rease  in 
film height and would be a benefit, r a the r  than a contributor to the 
difficulties. 
(b)  P r e s s u r e  Relief Valves 
Investigation a f te r  the accident revealed that all of the relief valves 
on the r e a r  and left  front high p res su re  skids  were  s e t  for too low a 
relief p r e s s u r e  so  that in  normal  operation some o r  all oi the flow to 
the individual r e c e s s e s  might be diverted to the r e tu rn  l ine,  depend- 
ing on the conditions existing in the pad p r e s s u r e  pat terns  at any 
given time. 
during the field operations immediately p r io r  to the final stoppage, 
s o  that their  position is not known f o r  cer ta in .  However the l a s t  
sett ing,  made 26 August, was s imi l a r  to that  on the other  skids.  
The relief valves on the f ront  r ight skids were  changed 
The  relief valve set t ings,  checked against  gauges cal ibrated with a aead 
weight t e s t e r  on 2 3  September were a s  follows: e 
11 
Recess  and Location Rear  Front  I i i  ght 
1 Corner  950 3000 
2 Center 1200 2050 
3 Corner  1080 3000 
4 Corner  1003 900 
5 Center 1200 1200 
6 Corner  810 1600 
, 
I All of the hydraulic components in the high p r e s s  
Front  Left 
900  
1200 
900 
1050 
1250 
900 
i r e  c i rc  i ts  a r e  ra ted 
f o r  5000 psi s e rv i ce  except the p re s su re  gauges which were  3000 psi. 
these components relief valves settings of 2500 to 3000 psi  would have been in 
o r d e r .  
With 
( c )  Shutoff Valves 
After the accident it was found that s eve ra l  of the shutoii valves 
downstream of the relief valve were  partially closed. 
on the valves in  the field indicate that the p r e s s u r e  drop a c r o s s  
Tes t s  run 
these valves as se t  w a s  in the o rde r  of 200 to 300  psi  for the full 
flow of oil through them. 
cause the p r e s s u r e  relief valves to function at a lower r e c e s s  
p r e s s u r e  than i f  they were fully open, and hence increase  the 
chance of the t r iggering relief valve acting a s  a p r e s s u r e  regulator ,  
o r  constant p r e s s u r e  source.  
In this condition they would tend to 
(d) High P r e s s u r e  F i l t e r s  
Tes ts  conducted on the high p r e s s u r e  f i l ters  a f te r  the fai lure  showed 
a p r e s s u r e  drop  of 80 to 100 psi  with the full flow of oil  a t  110°F.  
F o r  cooler  oil, as might be found in initial motion, the p r e s s u r e  
drop  would inc rease  with the increasing viscosity.  
Piping, Hoses and Downstream Check Valves (e) 
The p r e s s u r e  drop  through the piping, hoses  and downstream check 
valves,  a s  measu red  in the field w a s  approximately 25  psi. This 
12 
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p r e s s u r e  drop, along with that of the f i l ters  and the shutoff valves 
discussed above, acted to give the bearing a marginal  stiffness 
under the constant p re s su re  conditions provided by the relief valve 
a f te r  i t s  sett ing w a s  exceeded 
Oil 
The hydrostatic bearing is designed to operate  with an  oil  having a 
visocity of 560 SSU. The bearing oil  w a s  tested a f te r  the accident 
and w a s  found to have a viscocity of 661 SSU. 
increase  in viscocity of 6 0 1  SSU. 
viscocity is to increase  the p r e s s u r e  losses  in the l ines ana f ’ l  A t e r s  
and to inc rease  the bearing film height slightly under ordinary 
operating conditions. 
was beneficial to the bearing at the t ime of the accident. 
The effect of the 
The effect of the inc rease  in 
The action of the oil with increased  viscocity 
The r e c e s s  p r e s s u r e s  calculated during the design of the bearing were  
750 ps i  for  the corner  r e c e s s e s  and 900 psi  for the center  r e c e s s e s ,  based. on 
6 full flow to all r e c e s s e s  and a 1.5 x 10  
by the p r e s s u r e  in the hydraulic jacks lifting the alidade corner  at the t ime of 
l b  total  pad load. The pad load measu red  
b removal  of the pads for repa i r .was  1.6 x 1 0  
i nc reased  approximately 6 percent  to 800 and 960 psi  respectively.  
so that these figures should be 
F r o m  the information presented above it appears  that the relief valve 
set t ings for  the corner  r e c e s s e s  w e r e  marginal .  Using these calculated r e c e s s  
p r e s s u r e s  and the measu red  flow losses  in the high p r e s s u r e  f i l t e rs  and the 
l ines ,  resu l t s  in a c r i t i ca l  relief valve sett ing of approximately 900 psi. Hence 
any additional l o s ses  
p r e s s u r e  var ia t ions,  
p r e s s u r  e regulator . 0 
valves  for the center  
due to the partial  closing of the shutoff valves,  o r  r e c e s s  
would t r igger  the relief valve, making it function as a 
On the s a m e  basis  the normal  p r e s s u r e  at the relief 
r e c e s s  circuits is 1050 psi .  With a 1200 psi  sett ing there  
1 3  
is m o r e  possibility that full flow would be maintained in these c i rcu i t s ,  but 
the sett ings were  marginal  for operation. 
It is concluded that the dragging of the corner  of the r e a r  pad is directly 
re la ted to the very low relief valve setting for  r e c e s s  No. 6 and that the flow 
to the other corner  r e c e s s e s  may  have a l so  been reduced, causing nea r  ze ro  , 
film height over  the r e s t  of the pad. 
runner  and on the left i ron pad face indicate that a t  l ea s t  while the antenna was 
in position five, the front left pad operated a l so  with marginal  film height, 
although i t  never  became involved in a ser ious  scoring of the runner .  Tne 
right front pad operation is an enigma, because tes t s  conducted on 26 August 
indicate it was operating with normal film height at that  t ime and the marks an 
the bottom of the pad indicate that a t  l ea s t  par t  of the t ime  it was operating on 
minimal  film height. 
it is not possible to conclude definitely when the front two pads were  operating 
improperly.  
after 2 3  August and that the front right pad grounded on the c r e s t s  or' the 
resul t ing gal l  m a r k s .  
Certain patterns of s c ra t ches  on the 
Because of the uncertainty of all of the operating conditions 
There  is no question that the r e a r  pad was not operating properly 
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5. Repair and Tes ts  
Immediately af ter  the accident on 2 September the oil w z s  drained f rom 
Inspection of the runner  the next morning the hydrostatic bearing r e se rvo i r .  
indicated that the bottom of at  l ea s t  the right front pad w a s  damaged and 
possibly the other  two a lso  (at  this time the sequence of failure had not been 
developed). 
with the procedure which had been developed during the design phase of the 
bearing. Four  jacks were  used to lift the alidade co rne r  weldment, s tee l  
stools were  s e t  in place and the corner  weldment was lowered onto them. 
These  stools were  capable of supporting the antenna in a 120 mph wind. Rails 
were  then fastened to the under s ide of the co rne r  weldment and t rol leys  were  
fitted to c a r r y  the pad. 
used to  l i f t  the pad and i t  was then rolled out on the t r ack  to  a point where it 
could be l if ted c l ea r  with a crane.  
in  position ready to  be moved out. 
Work was s t a r t ed  immediately to remove the pads in accordance 
Turnbuckles between the pad and the t rol leys  were  
The photograph of F igure  3 shows the pad 
Runner r epa i r  w a s  accomplished by chipping and grinding OUX loose metal 
and filling the groove by a r c  welding. The welds were  then hand ground roughly 
and finished by hand with a file until the original f latness requirement  of . G O 3  in. 
over  60  in. was met .  Actually the maximum out of f latness in the repa i red  a r e a  
is approximately .002 in. , and the a r e a  can be detected only by the difference in 
tex ture  between the or iginal  machine finish on the balance of the runner and the 
file f inish in the repa i red  a r e a .  The process  is shown in F igures  19 through 2 3 .  
Tes t s  on the relief valves were conducted.at the Rohr Corporation on 
6 September  and subsequent tes t s  , duplicating operating conditions were  
conducted in the field on the pumps, filters, relief valves and other components. 
The  damaged pads were  taken to a shop in Los Angeles where the damaged 
portion was repa i red  by welding, the faces  remachined and a new phosphate 
15 
coating was applied. 
.005 in. and the original f latness tolerances were  met .  
Total meta l  removal f rom the original w a s  l e s s  than 0 
The hear ing w a s  the reassembled with the r e se rvo i r  w a l l s  repa i red  and 
repainted and the ent i re  assembly returned to new condition. All of this work 
was done by the general  contractor ,  the Rohr Corporation, and the bear ing 
subcontractor ,  the Rucker Company, a t  their  own expense with no cost  to  The 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory o r  to the government. 
I 
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6 .  Hydraulic System Modifications 
After a thorough review of the hydraulic sys tem and the overal l  bearing 
operation the following modifications a r e  being made to the pad hydraulic 
sys t ems  and interlocks: 
(a) A flow switch s e t  to actuate at approximately 4 gpm is being placed 
jus t  ups t ream of the relief valve a t  the pad for  each circui t .  These  
flow switches,  together with a logic c i rcui t ,  w i l l  tu rn  on a warning 
light in the control room i f  flow to any r e c e s s  drops.  
motion will be shut should a pat tern of flow fai lures  giving inade- 
quate bearing support  occurs .  It should be noted that the bearing 
will operate  safely when flow to any one r e c e s s  is  stoppea and 
when flow to a number of combinations of two r e c e s s e s  is stop?ed. 
The skid p r e s s u r e  gauges which have a 300 ps i  range a r e  being 
replaced with gauges having a 5000 psi  range which will permi t  
setting the relief valves at  3000 to 3500 p s i  (well above the expected 
operating range but within the capacity of all of the sys tem 
components). 
Azimuth 
(b) 
(c) Film height gauges a r e  being installed at each co rne r  of each pad. 
These will: 
1. Light a warning light in the control room i f  any co rne r  
approaches within .006 in. of the runner.  
Light a r e d  light and shut down azimuth motion i f  any pad 
co rne r  approaches wi th in .  003  in. of the runner.  
Provide  continuous monitoring of the film height in the 
control room. 
2.  
3 .  
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(d) A visible type flow m e t e r  h a s  been installed in the drain l ines at 
each skid to detect leakage flows f rom the pump case  dra ins  o r  
through the relief valves. 
pump conditions without removal f rom the circuit .  
Flagged locks a r e  being placed on the relief valves and the shutoff 
valves. 
p resence  a s s u r e s  that the valve is in proper  position for  operation. 
The runner  joint bolt holes were  plugged because d i r t  which might 
have sett led in them w a s  a suspected cause of some of the pad 
damage observed. 
alloy which w a s  poured in place with a key to s e c u r e  it ana then 
finished flush with the runner surface.  
This  is a l so  of ass i s tance  in testing the 
(e)  
These locks must  be removed to adjust  the valves and their  
( f  ) 
This w a s  accomplished with a low melting point 
18 
APPENDIX I 
Statement by Don McClure ( Je t  Propulsion Laboratory Si te  Resident Engineer)  
regarding the hydrostatic bear ing f a i l u r e  on Thursday, 2 September 1965. ' 
"I returned to the iMars Site f rom the Echo Site a t  about 4: 15 p. m. 
antenna had been rotated in azimuth approximately 180 degrees .  
a f te r  a r r iv ing ,  D. Ramsey (Rohr Construction Site Superintendent) told 
m e  that they had been rotating in azimuth when the antenna appeared to 
come up against  a h a r d  spot. 
on the right front hydro bearing pad were  not normal .  The p r e s s u r e s  
indicated to h im that the pad was caught o r  tilting, and had not righted 
i tself .  
checked the skid f rom one end to the other  and all controls on the hign 
p r e s s u r e  skid for the right front pad appeared to  be normal .  
a c rew of men  to work greasing the sockets that  had been greased  about 
two weeks ea r l i e r  by a Representative of The Rucker Company. 
m e n  were  greasing the sockets ,  D. Ramsey and I discussed the apparent 
t i l t ing of the pad, and why the pad had not r ighted i tself .  
the pad had grounded, we decided to take up a s e t  of fee le r  gauges and 
m e a s u r e  around the pad while it was floating to s e e  i f  it w a s  grounded. 
W e  went, and D. Ramsey checked the pad using fee le r  gauges and 
de termined  that ,  as facing the pad looking toward the center  of the 
antenna, the l e f t  f ront  corner  w a s  up to about 3 thousands of an  inch, the 
l e f t  r e a r  co rne r  was up about 10 o r  12  thousands of an inch. 
The 
Shortly 
He sa id  he noticed that the r e c e s s  p r e s s u r e s  
He  sa id  that he  checked the p r e s s u r e  relief valves on the skid and 
I i e  then se t  
Wnile the 
To determine i f  
On the right 
I- 1 
side he indicated that it w a s  up about 10 thousands o i  an  inch. l'ionciering 
i f  the pad had scored  the runner ,  we decided to move the pad back away 
f rom this spot about t h ree  o r  four feet. He sent  Walt Xaas up  to rotate 
the antenna in azimuth, while he (D. Ramsey)  felt the runner sur face  
a f te r  the pad moved away f rom it. After  some exercis ing as to which 
direction was the proper  way to go, the pad moved to the left or original 
direction of t ravel ,  probably a foot and then was returning back to the 
antenna's original position. 
w a s  a sound, which sounded like rubber  rubbing against  metal .  
t ime  we all jointly agreed  that the pad had finally righted itself. 
few seconds,  the antenna was sti l l  moving, t he re  were  seve ra l  loud 
cracking o r  popping noises .  I then saw that the anti-rotation link s tub in  
the pad had failed and bent, and the pad had caught, s o  that the left front 
co rne r  hit the outside through wall. At this point, oil  s t a r t ed  to leak and 
af te r  considerable amount of yelling, the antenna w a s  stopped. The work 
D. Ramsey was feeling the runner when there  
At that 
Within a 
then s t a r t ed  in plugging this leak with rags .  " 
1-2 
VlTI'ORlO CASTELLI. PH.D. 
Report on Visit to 2lO9-AZ-EL Antenna at Goldstone on 0 Sept 17 and 18, 1965 
At the invitation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
I visited the Qoldstone s i t e  for the purpose of' examining 
the damage and history of the azimuth bearing failure, 
trying to establish the causes of such failure, and maklng 
recommendations for the future. 
My conclusions can be divided into three groups: 
a)cause8 and modality of failure; b)repaira and modifications; 
c)tests and long range recommendationsZ The ideas in these 
groups are expounded In what follows: 
a)Causes and Moaality of Failure 
From a l l  evidence at the site, it can be conoluded that 
the controls at the three bearing pumping stations were 
tampered with or mishandled in such a manner that the 
bearings were operating at approximately full load carrying 
capacity but close to zero stiffness. This was accomplished 
by resetting the pressure relief valves which are located 
In the line between the high pressure punps and the recesses 
at an unsafe value of the pressure (approximately 9OOpsiz 
No accurate numbera on these settings can be obtained due 
to laok of oallbratlons of the field gauges and the laboratory 
gauges). To oompound the seriousness of the situation the 
valves which are directly upatrem of the recess88 (yellow 
handle valves) were found open by lesa than one full turn 
a 
0 
2 
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(the full lmplloations of this action are hard to assess 
with oertalnty because of the lack of charts of valve 
characteristiosJ 
Although the pressure eettlnga were oloae to those 
registered by the gauges during normal pperatlon, the a m o m  
system failed because it was forced to operate at 
constant pressure rather than at constant flow ae It was 
designed; The only atiffnese of the system was provided by 
the bell shape of the film and the emall reslstancee in the 
line from the relief valves and the recesae8 (this Include6 
the yellow valve losses): The designed stiffness Is close 
to luinlty for all practloal loads: This means that the 
designed film would be maintained under great varlatlons In 
load: However, after these aOts of benevolent sabotage 
the stiffness was approximately zero and only oame Into the 
picture when the f i l m  was nearly collapsed; 
To elucidate these pohta, it muet be pointed out that 
an operational bearing system need not only be able to 
supply lubricant at the pressure needed to carry the load 
at steady state, but also should raise the feeding pressure 
when the load Increases and the film thickness decreasea: 
This feabure l a  called etlf~ese and makes the bearing a 
stable system since it can oppose all perturbing forced 
The stiffness of a constant flow system is due to the fact 
that the feeding pressure c a n  rise a8 muoh as needed to 
push a given amount of fluid through the bearing clearanoe 
In a given time'; This happens regardless of load: But ,  $f 
3 
VlTTORlO CASTELLI, PH. D. 
the feeding preesure I s  limited by a presaure re l ie f  valve, 
the system stiffness becomes zero any time the feeding 
pressure need8 to become higher than the valve setting 
(which I s  when stiffness ie needed the most). 
Due to the faot that the relief valves were set at nearly t 
the correct operating pressure, the bearing was carrying 
most of the weight of the antenna but, due to the lack of 
atiffneas, could not establish any film: Contact occurred 
over large areas of the bearing pad8 although the contact 
forces were rather small: (some film thickness wa8 established 
due to film shape effects and line resistance effect8 whioh 
come into play at small f f d w  %tea but which I shall Bot 
diseuse In detail here): Burnishing marks are evident to 
demonstrate the validity of the above statements: When 
some debris o r  some particular circumstances we- met by 
the rear pad, scratches developeU 
complete failure during the course of two pa88eS: When the 
l e f t  front pad passed over the scored area It failed also: 
and degenerated Into 
-
The right fr 
ner and shows only burnishing mark8 of varying intensity: 
pad never passed over failed regions of the rulwr 
To summarize, the eystem failed because of restriotlone 
and mistaken settlngs imposed on the feeding sjrstem against 
the specificatrons and the directlons of the instruotlon manual: 
The system is quite simple In its outward appearanoe 
and many people may have d z ? m  the conclusion that they 
really understand how It  operates but in the cow88 of 
4 
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time events have ocourred which have shown the contrary 
about some people,ln responsible positions; (This point 
could be elaborated upon with at least four examples 
of serious misconceptions whioh I found personallyf No 
system will ever be Idiot-proof and atriot in8truotione 
will have to furnished and inforued for the antenna to 
As far as the intensity and the pattern of the failure 
I s  concerned, it is pbvlous that the pad oonetradiht 
mechanism (the mechanism that prevents the pad from rotating 
about a vertlca2 a x l a )  aggravated the situation by driving 
one of the pad edges down onto the runner. The fact that 
this wa8 a desi@ error was known to all concerned before 
the failure. To alleviate the feeling of regret for not 
having modified this feature It can be observed that, 
unless the constraint mechanism started the galling process, 
the failure would have progreseea to the point of giving 
obvious hints such as smoke, ~ound, e t d  Therefore, the 
conatraiat menhanism may only be responsible for accsleratlng 
the failure but not for cauelng It,' 
The monitoring system showed to be inadequate, since 
It fai led to s h o w  any signs of the poor operatlng conditione 
whioh must have persisted for many days: Pressure readlngs 
shold be taken downstream of all major reslatanoes in the 
feed lines If they should indloate recess conditions: 
The positive detection of flow to the bearing I s  essential 
sin= it defines a "60" oonditioa 
, 
5 
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The fac t  that the preaaures in the various recesse8 
are usually unequal ehould not misconstrued a8 poor operation 
since suoh is the optimum design condition. Above a l l ,  
hbqcttempts should be made t o  equalize the pressures by 
m e a n 8  of relief valve  setting^, stc': 
As far as the t i m i n g  of the failure and its cause8 
l a  concerned,the only statement that can be made l a  that 
damage staated on 8-24-1964': By then the valves had been 
misaet,' However, due to  the nature of the fa i lure  1% I s  
hard t o  say how low before the start of the damage the 
system tampering had occurred: The assessing of reeponaibili- 
t i e s  may be d i f f icu l t  since it is possible that the general 
notion had been created to  set  the syetem In the mistaken 
way:  heref fore, it is possible that  eeveral people set 
I .  
the re l ie f  valves in the wrong way a t  different times an6 
that the system ran In an extremely poor condition for 
nearly a month u n t i l  a chip o r  other fortultoue event 
s tar ted the serious failure: , 
b~)€bpairs and Bfodificatlons: 
All scratohes on the runner and pads of width greater than 
3/16' and depth greater than 3l20' should be f i l l ed  apd 
ground back t o  the origlnaltoleranoea by a auitable procees: 
Phosphate treatment should also be reapplied since it showed 
t o  be beneficial In all l ight contact areas: Miaor aoratched 
should be atoned so that they present no aaperitiee: 
7-, 17 Ji ---.‘- -- 1 
6 I .  
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Taking advantage of the  occasion that the bearing pads ’ 
are back in a machine shop, the pad constraint mechanism 
should be changed t o  a type which limits Its ac t ion  t o  
a 
prevent- r o t a t i o n  of the pad without introducing extraneous 
foroee(thl8 hae been dlecueeed with e: Horaoe Phillip6 
of J~I?~’Tt! ,  John Bate8 of Ruoker, and Salvatore Roccl 
of Rob) .  
The feeding system should be modified aoabkrCLUg t o  this: 
f i l t e rs :  As such, the valves should be s e t  a t  more than 
4000 pal., held there by means of pins and possibly seald: 
4)the gate valves downstream of the rel ief  valves are in 
the system t o  help set the rel ief  valves and t o  enable 
check-out crews t o  c-ry out performance tests: When such 
chores have been accompl1ahed;these va3ves should be secured 
a t  t he i r  full open poeition by means of pins and possibly sealed: 
5)the maintenance and operation manual Issued by the Rucker 
Company never mentions the rel ief  valves In the set  up 
procedure as  It probably assumes that Rucker personnel 
should have set euc h valves when the system wae delivered.” 
1)flow t o  the recesses In excess of a preset minimum shnuld 
be readily detected t o  indlaate safe pperation ( thle  cafl 
be aocomplished by means of Venturi tube In  the feeding line): 
2)the recess pressures xxx be measured downstream of all 
f i l t e r s ,  valses and other major 2waietances~ 
: I  
should 
3)the relief valves are in the lines t o  protect the pumps 
and motors from the consequences of plwged high pressure 
I .  
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Not as readily explainable, however, is the absence of 
any mention of the relief valves in the trouble-shooting 
procedure seotion: The manual d~?6CriptiOn of the syetem 
functioning is not suffloiently terse: Even the fact that thie 
le a constant flow system and how sueh a system operates 
cannot be reaeily gathered: Therefore, portions of the manual 
dealing with the system descriptions, initial set-up, 
0 
check-out proce8ure8, and trouble-shootlng should be 
rewritten: Moreover, a brief but olear set of lnstruotlona . ,  
should be attached to each of the bearing stations 
(possibly on eboesed plate); 
6)the Rucker manual is also not clear on how m a n y  super- 
charge pumps should operate at any one the: This should 
be included som that no doubts can arise on the fact that a 
both pumps should be operative with some simple detection ayatem 
t o  debct if any one of the papa goes out of order: 
BczkWee redundancy is preferable to etand-by from the 
polnt of view of reliablllt$ and the resulting extra fllterlng 
w i l l  definetely be useful t o  the 011; 
7)clear responaibillty of the operation of the bearing 
should be assigned to one person at the site: Such a person 
should be thoroughly lnetruoted by *. Phllllps, Mr, Bates, 
or me on the baslo ideas behind the dealgnz Then he could 
draw intelligent conolueions about any benevolent sabotage ntfnm 
attempted In the future: As an exanple of such threats 
I will mention that, on my last visit to the site, * I heard 
. . . . . . __ . .  
. .  
* .  
. .  a 
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the rumor that the retain- plates of the runner Joint 
wedge8 were intended to be removed because they “are a 
nuisance in sealing the trough wall”! Due t b  the conside- 
rable motion of the runner(both axial and circumferential) 
, 
this would result In almost certain disaster: 
9)Since I wa8 responsible for the basic design of the system 
and I am very Interested In its suucess from the point of 
view of Its significance to the state of the art, I propose that 
I advice on any possible change, testing, instructing, 
and manual writing Involved with the hydrostatlo bearing: 
I will be glad to performethese services free of charge: 
@)Tests and Long Range Recommendations. 
A set of tests should be performed to establish the charac- 
teristics of all parts of the system. I particularly 
reC01~m8nd:%d determiner 1)the high pressure pump flow rates 
at various pressures up to 4000psf; 2)the filter reeletame; 
3)the reelstance of check ValV08; $)the recess pressures 
and film shapes for sample antenna positions and all 
pump failure uombinatione contemplated In the design; 
5)reoorded history of recess pressures throughout one 
complete revolution of the antenna3 6)data on the behavionr 
of downstream pressure agaiat flow for the pressure relief val- 
ves after they have atartbed discharging; data on the exact 
weight of the antenna on each of the three feet; 8)meaeure- 
ment of the ciroumferentia motion of the mnner during 
n 
- . .  . .  
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repeated passes of the antenna feet: 0 
9 
A l l  such data should be referred to me for conclusions 
on the pattern of the last failure and for understandimg 
of the true relation between the design and the prototype 
and thus estrrbllahlng a predlotlon of future behavior: 
The most important recommendation I s  to issue and enforce 
a strict set  of rules concerning experimentation with 
and modification of the bearing system: A concise;znZear, 
and thorough manual should be written and made available: 
Above all, a s-le person should be well  lnatructed and 
made responsible for the system: S l m e  It l a  impossib~e to 
construct an Idiot-proof eystem, the next best solution is to 
keep the idiots away from It! 
0 Mr Horace Phillips 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Pasadena, California. 
Dear Horace , 
This letter l e  to clarify a point on my report on the 
visit to the 210' AZ-EL Antenna at Go18stonez Some misunderstan&h 
ding may result from my denomination of right a d  left front 
pads: I intended right and left f r o m  the point of view 
of 811 observed to whom the antenna l e  pointing when In 
its horizon position," For an observer located at the 
azimuth axis these denominations would obviously be 
reversed: I hope you will make this point clear t o  a l l  
concerned and that I have not miEaled you in my conclusions: 
Best Regards 
Vittorlo Caetelli 1 
i 
. .. . . . .  
. *  
- HYDROSTATIC BEARING REPAIR AND REPORT 
DSIF 14 0 6 A " A  - PLUG RUNNER HOSE 
I 
.JPL CONT 950650 C/O #38 
1 
ScOpE: 
Enar : HP P n i l l i D s  X4741 9.0~: HE M c D Q x u M X ~ ~ Q Q  
QJC : JP  Frey x3%6 
ReDair hydrostatic bearing and resume antenna erection, 
WW Lord X3946 
30hy: GM Faughender 714-422-7112 X553 
Rucker: H J  Bates 415-653-5221 
2 1- RP-dS scored D on Ramsey X371 DH McClure X354 
Rohr/Rucker/JPL Field inspection of damaae 
Plot of 4 SeD MG Newsted Runner data WD Merrick a 3 8 5  HPP . I '  
C /Vista Mta - Enm Question l is t  & "No f i x  till answers" 
3 
5 
c - 
\Relief valve t e s t s  at  Rohr 
Metal 6 ~ r a v  runner f i x  disapproved 
4 Re-finalefort ion 
Runner weld procedure (draf t )  
ie ld  hyds'ostatic t e s t s  
17 F i r s t  Rohr recovery schedule - Reliner welder a u a l i f i e a  
\V Cas te l l i  t o  Keystone Enma & si te  
I S  ed B ad fl atness a t  Kevs t one JPE; 
Zf S t a r t  runner welding 
23 Pads back on s i t e  
Good f ie ld  hyd t e s t s  complete4 
for  welded runner n l w s  
PL/Rohr review of ent i re  subject aC Rohr 
C/O Rea WDM/HA D avis X?O 20 
Twx advice of C/Order #38 sirnature RH Bar t le t t  ~1078 
24 / C / V i s t a  Responsibility Mtg: Rohr VS Rucker . 
\racks found i n  pad post welds 
saMta Rohr/Rucker - Defective H/P f i l t e r s  admitted 
Mta FE McCreery/Woodward 
ohr TIX 1 Excellent minutes of 1 Oct  Mta GMF 
chem analysis shows 47 D t s  carbon unweldablg 
ound collapsed H/P f i l t e r s  b 
i l t e r s  returned t o  purolatel: , 
& I  a -  eed 'bolted p la te  f i x  f o r  Post weld cracks 
welded. 
Sch and tech f i x  mta a t  GTS. HHP 
\ Pad post fix approved. 
5 IF Pad holes plugged. D. Hester X 3 a  
F P  r Pad post repair  complete. 
/ S  S t a r t  trough instal la t ion.  
19 I C  S t a r t  pad instal la t ion.  
I S t a r t  o i l  cond. 
3 1  9 Y C. pad instal la t ion.  
J /  ..C e l  bra  repair .  
3 2  I e down on wds. 
29 JPL report  (draf t )  complete. HHp 
a4 Rohr report  (draft) complete 
I C troughs. 
2 F i l l  hyd brg. 
4L First az rotation, 
r 
r Rohr reDort a t  JPL, 
r Centrifuge on s i te  
Hyd brP checked & operation$ 
f Hi-pressure f i l t e r s  on s i t e  
// Mametic wipers on s i t e  
mPermIx xv 
Film Height6 on Right Front Pad Measured 30 July 65 - 
F i r s t  Test 
Last  Test 
.0085 in  
,0068 
.010 i n  
.0085 
008 
,0055 
,OO 88 
,006 
7 
. 
,007 in 
.006 
c 
,008 
,0058 
I 
i 
,0092 
.0068 
j !  
~ APPENDIX Y 
Figure 
No. 
List of Photographs 
Title 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
0 17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
2 4  
Right Front  P a d  Before Removal 
Pad Being Removed 
Gall Marks Under Right Front P a d  
Scratches in  Runner at Four  O'Clock Position 
Scratches in  Runner at Five O'Clock Position 
Scratches in Runner at Seven O'Clock Position 
Scratches in  Runner at Ten O'Clock Position 
Gall  Marks in Runner at Ten O'Clock Position 
Scratches in  Runner at Eleven O'Clock Position 
Typical Gall Mark at a Bolt Hole 
Bottom Face of Right Front  F a d  
Closeup of Right F ron t  Pad  Damage 
Bottom Face of Rear  P a d  
Closeup of Rea r  P a d  Damage 
Bottom Face  of Front  Left P a d  
Closeup of Left Front  P a d  
Millwright Chipping Runner Damage Area  
Millwright Grinding Runner Damage Area  
Millwright Welding Runner Damage Area  
Millwright Grinding Welds on Runner 
Final  Grinding on Runner 
Negative 
Number 
332 7684A 
332 7687B 
332 7699A 
332 7698A 
332 7698B 
332 7699B 
332 7701A 
332 7701B 
332 7702A 
332 7702B 
332 7597A 
332 7597B 
332 7693 
332 7674A 
332 7697A 
332 7697B 
332 7720A 
332 7719A 
332 7731B 
332 7748B 
332 7748A 
P 
4 '  
APPrnIX v 
RICHFIELD OIL CORPORATION 
WATSON REFINERY 
. i  
' 1  
0. u 0.0s 
0.04 
Orig ina l  Signed a 
C. II. Brown 
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B. From i n i t i a l  operation, December 4, 1964 through A u g m t  18, l%5, 
relief valve settings were at  1500 psi (well above the l i f t -of f  
and working pressures). 
testimony of the h m o s t a t i c  bearing program manager substantiate 
these settings. 
Both the start-up instructions, 2nd the 
0. 
C. A u g u s t  19 and 20, 1965, a s\lbcontractor technician worked on the 
high wessure skids, and admittedly reset t h e  r e l i e f  valves t o  the 
900 pei - 1200 pi pattern described earlier. 
It was subsequent t o  the  last autlon above, t h a t  damage was incurred. 
Moreover, tests conducted a t  the s i t e  established t h a t  t he  shut-off 
valves (downstream of the elief valves) were nearly cloGed during 
rotatloas performed by Rohr s&sequent t o  August 20, 1965, which 
conibinzd w i t h  t he  flov diversion a t  the r e l i e f  valve, further l i a i ted  
pressure build-up under the pads and caused the damage. 
On Septeniber 3, 1965, a meeting vas held at Coldstone t o  Inspect the  
damage and determine proper methods of repairing and preventative 
measures against any future occurrences. 
1. Extent of Damge and Repair 
\ 
The runner was danrrged in varying degrees *om a scratch t o  gmges 
epproximtely 2 1/1 inches wfde and .&O" deep. 
damage or  gouging w a ~  over approximtely 180' of the rum&. 
Reference J'h Dwg. SK-134585. 
The extensive 
, 
. 
. ' I .  
. 
Three tpethcds of repair- tka runner were d i c c ~ ~ ~ s e d :  
I .  
€bsitlon 
1 '. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1, io0 
83Q 
t 
carry the bad at steady state, but also should raise the fe- 
becam zero eny ti= t h e  feeding ~ e o s m  needs to becoxe higher 
than tba valve setthg." End of quote. 
101 
A 
Rob w i l l  e x m i s e  the f o l l c w i ~  COlTective or  test- step 
inmediately: 
AO A complete s y s t e m  field check as soon as the repairs 8r'e 
. 
I& rotation w i l l  be pernrltted without this docunznt be- 
\ 
m 
t 
. 
I 
I -  
. 
. 
. 
\ 
IIWRODWION 
4 
This work summrizes the results of the hydrostatic bearing pwer unit tes ts  
run Segtenber 23 and 24, 1965, with representatives f r o m  Rob, R u c k e r  and JPL 
present. Infomation as to  certain characteristics of the major components 
of the high pesure  syatem was accumulsted and recorded. The data collected 
wa8 asehllated thoroughly, reviewed, and indicates that damgz t o  the 
hydrostatic bearing can be t ied directly t o  the relief valve settings, and to 
the nearly closed position of the &ownstream shut-ofi valves. a 
I 
. 
The field testing of the high pressure hyilraulic system definitely plrOve8 
the damage was due to mdadJustments and not system failure. 
The system d e d  ,the following: 
1. U.OO-E~O psi lift-off pressure; 900 psi (appmximte)  w o r u  pressure. 
2. A minlmua of 7.5 OR4 flm per recesa. (Operating condition) 
The data taken during the field tests  and s-ized I n  this report definitely 
proms the sys%em capbil l t ies  are  in excess of the requirements. 
J 
f 
A 
0 
. 
i 
. I  
a portable suprchelsge Ut with th is  s~rchargc9 u h t  connected to a hlgh 
Relief valves vere checked in  the 88 is condition t o  verify check 
2. The relief mlws verc then set  to m l i m  at; 3000 pi and cheekd for 
reset pressure h l .  Reference -0 3. 
I 
? 
. 
~. 
b 
c. $oxmecthg t h e  complete hydraulic l b  fro= t i i  pqp to ond 
including the cbeck valve at  the gad (see F- 1) v i t h  t k ;e  
shut off valve fUll open, t b  pressrace drop et tb pad was masumd 
Thio test waa run with a nut behind the spring qn t h e  fil%er by 
msa valve which increased the epr- tension forcing =re o i l  
to feed th-ough the filter and incr~asin(3 the preostrre drop a c m s  
tl-re filter. 
t 
t 
the p e s a u r c  drop t o  the  p d  vas t'nen ncnourod at  150 psi. . 
c 
A,fter c o m e t i o n  of t b  t e s t s ,  e U  relief valves were set 'a t  3000 p12 (G&JEC~ 
to increase after review at Rob) and the shut off valves were left full opn. 
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Reference , 
Per request, 8 each of the subject valve8 wem tested by Functional Test on 
September 6 ,  l965, aa follouar 
Test Conditionr 
(a) Test Yedia: mto-7808 
(b) Flaw Rater 7.5 GPM 
(u) Gauge #P-1120: 012009 PSI 
Teat Reeultar 
NO - 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6, 
7 .+w 
valve I. P. 
Position #S - Yad #3 
Position 86 - Pad #3 
Position #3 - Pad 13 
Position #1 - Pad #3 
Position #2 - Pad #3 
Position #b - Pad 13 
Position #2 - Pad #2 
Relief wansure Settin8 -. Oil Teq. 
uoo PSI 
880 PSI 
960 PSI 
715 PSI 
1080 PSI 
900 PSI 
a0 PSI ++ 
9 Valve reeeata a t  720 PSI. 
w)) U n i t  seal became broken. Seal- re-establlsked 
One hand controlled valve was checked by applying 1500 PSI to  valve in cioaed 
poaitfon. While pressure was applied, valve was opened one q u d e r  (4) . -  turn.
T h i s  caused pressure to drop t o  380 PSI with sewn (7) ---P Clql-+. 
I 
Prior t o  testing, t h e  pressure gauge #P-lUO was chocked for calibration 
againat a dead weight t e s t o r  traceable t o  the Nations Bureau of Standmile. Y * 
Pleaae advLee if any further. * .  detai l8  are d e S h W d 0  
. 
. .  
t 
. .  . .  
" ,. A '  1 . 8 '  . 
. .  . .  
L I t in re& der ax W0891-ACif 
1 -  . .I 
1 ,  
R .  A. Peterren 
' Wviafon A * 9/13/65 
. ,  
I From: ' '.A. C. Manos ,t&@= 1 '  0 .  
. .  
Repairing of the Hydroetatic Bearbg; Runner 
I . .  
' Subjccc 
Refctcne J.' P. L. 210' Antenna ~* 
. .  Following i r  the rec-ended operatione to rework the bydrostat ic  bmtlng runnar. . 
Rohr. 
Thio procedure yo8 mutually agreed to, by C. HsCau1 of J.P.L. and A. C. &wo of I .  
. .  
. L  
I 
. b. I 
. .   1. '. .Hand cle n bearing surface with acetone, Eaove ell o i l  fram 
2.. . . Hand chiee l  t o  remove any loose metal fm gouged area, 
,,.weld area. . .  . .  
<. . I .  
b I^ . . .:, 3. .. Set dial  indicator6 prior to welding, record and check reading '. . 
* during and a f t e r  w l d i n g  of O~LQ oix fodt  sections. 
I .  
. -  . _  ' 4, .., , Use 3/32 and 1/8" dia. 87018 electrode$, lcprgn,r e'lectrodee ohtal l ' .  . , 
..;' not be usad. 
. .  
' . ,  
. *  * .  . . . .  . .  . ..S.. ' '. A l l  welding shall be accosrplishcd With ,~~trPogas-t@ado osmly, 
6. *. . :. Each weld (one weld rod conetdtutaa 020 wold) o h n l l  have o 
.. . 
. e  
I .  
minimum of 30" center8 or ar opecified by th3 copizsint Weld . .  
1 . $  
. Engineer. 
I 
* \  
* 7. Spot check w i n g  D.P.M. for external dofccto. .. * 
r . ,  
. ,  
i 4 
' 
'_ 8. . . e e .  The i n i t i a l  welding eha l l  ba nccrn8plfnhed trndor t3e  bi rcc t foa  of 
' .  " - a  Weld Engineer, and a l l  welding shall be ~on'itored by Iaspxtboa. . 
*. . . A  
' ft is recatmended that only o m  wal6ar begin t h i o  prcccduze -.til 
,. L . 'one six foot  oection.has bsra c q l a t c d .  
Quality Standards: 
Welding shall be accomplished to rC?rcmmt t h  hf,:hcsct cc=arcisl 
qual i ty  workmanohip. 
\ 
.; ' ' 3  
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AUTHOR1 Z E D  II 
TECHNICAL I N F O R M A T I O N  
REQUEST 
DE'T. EXT.  
a 
RE F E R E N C E S  
- 
2- -- 
d 
6 U B J i C T  
Analysis of Antenna Netal Samples 
ASSIGNED TO 'GROUP 
Ye Rogers 24-1 
P R E ? A R E O  B Y  
3. Chips znd shavinzs found i n  runner splice b o l t  holes 
hetveen KO. B 3 rear e 
Glob (chipped o f f  pad) inside center bcarlxig p& fi. 
Chigs and shavinzs i n  runner splice bolt holes 
between boa- 2 & 3* 
b t x c e n  bearing pad 1 & 2, foreign matter found i n  
L. Glob ( ch ipxd  ofY' p-.. d y a d  left hand inside bearing pad $I.* 
5. 
6, 
7. . 
runner splice b o l t  hole - center hole ohly. t 
8, Eearing pad o r  m e r  shaviqs slivers. .-* 
9. Cliips in o i l  
?2mxnXm 
10, Chips in o i l  
"lie chemical composition of aU. samples was identical, 
carbon, maxypnese , and sil icon. 
They consiste 02 iroc, 
b 
I '. 
31- 1 2 3  
